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ABSTRACT 
 
This article seeks to open up to critical scrutiny the attempts currently being 
made to re-engineer post-Cold War US military power to directly confront global 
south urbanization. Through analysing the discourses produced by US military 
commentators about ‘urban warfare,’ and the purported military, technological, 
and robotic solutions that might allow US forces to dominate and control global 
south cities in the near to medium-term future, the paper demonstrates that such 
environments are being widely essentialised as spaces which necessarily work to 
undermine the United States’ military’s high-technology systems for surveillance, 
reconnaissance and targeting. The paper shows how, amid the on-going urban 
insurgency in Iraq, widescale efforts are being made to ‘urbanise’ these military 
systems so that US military forces can attempt to assert high-tech dominance 
over the fine-grained geographies of global south cities in the future. This 
includes an examination of how, by 2007, US forces, in close collaboration with 
the Israeli military, had already begun to implement ideas of robotised or 
automated urban warfare to counter the complex insurgencies in Iraq. The paper 
concludes with a critique of the urban and robotic turns in US military doctrine. 
 
NOTE: An earlier version of this paper was published by the Crisis States 
research centre at LSE in their working paper series. 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE URBANIZATION OF WAR 
 
“War has entered the city again – the sphere of the everyday” 
(Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003, 272). 
 
“Contemporary urban warfare plays itself out within a 
constructed, real or imaginary architecture, and through the 
destruction, construction, reorganization, and subversion of 
space” (Weizman, 2006) 
 In the ‘new’ wars of the post Cold War -- which increasingly straddle the 
‘technology gaps’ separating advanced industrial nations from non-state or 
informal fighters and insurgents of various types – cities are emerging as the key 
sites (Kaldor, 2007). Indeed, urban areas are now the ‘lightning conductors’ for 
the world’s political violence. Warfare, it seems, like everything else, is being 
urbanised.  
 
Western military theorists and researchers are now particularly preoccupied with 
how the geographies of global south cities, and processes of global south 
urbanisation, are beginning to influence both the geopolitics and the techno-
science of post Cold-war political violence. Indeed, almost unnoticed within ‘civil’ 
urban geography and social science, a large ‘shadow’ system of military urban 
research is quickly being established. Funded by Western military research 
budgets, this is quickly elaborating how such effects are allegedly already 
becoming manifest, and how the global intensification of processes of 
urbanisation will deepen them in the future (Graham, 2004a).  As Keith Dickson, 
a US military theorist of urban warfare puts it, the increasing perception within 
Western militaries is that: 
“For Western military forces, asymmetric warfare in urban areas will 
be the greatest challenge of this century […]. The city will be the 
strategic high ground – whoever controls it will dictate the course of 
future events in the world” (Dickson, 2002a, 10) 
 
Motivated by the growing realisation that the scale and significance of 
contemporary processes of urbanisation across the world might significantly 
reshape the geopolitics, doctrine and realities of post Cold War Western military 
strategy, such research fuels a crucial set of techno-military discourses. Within 
and through these, attempts are currently being made to reconstitute the 
structure, orientation and techno-science of western military power to directly 
reflect the alleged implications of such urbanisation.  
 The central consensus amongst the wide variety of western military theorists 
pushing for such shifts is that “modern urban combat operations will become one 
of the primary challenges of the 21st century” (DIRC, 1997, 11). Major Kelly 
Houlgate (2004), a US Marine Corps commentator, notes already that, “of 26 
conflicts fought over [by US forces” between 1984 and 2004, “21 have involved 
urban areas, and 10 have been exclusively urban”.  Included here are iconic 
operations like the US military’s “Black Hawk Down” humiliations in Mogadishu in 
1991, their operations in Kosovo in 1999 and Beirut in the 1980s, and their 
various recent operations in the Caribbean and Central American regions 
(Panama City (1989), Grenada (1983) and Port-au-Prince (1994)). Influential 
urban conflicts such as those at Grozny in Chechnya (1994), Sarajevo (1992-
1995), and Israel-Palestine also loom large in current military debates about the 
urbanization of warfare (Graham, 2004c). 
 
The US military’s focus on military operations within the domestic urban sphere is 
also being dramatically strengthened by the so-called ‘ war on terror’. This deems 
cities and their key infrastructures to be the key ‘battlespaces’, whether at home 
or abroad. Through such an analytical lens, the LA riots of 1992, the various 
attempts to securitise urban cores for major sports events or political summits, 
the military responses to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, or the 
challenges of ‘homeland security’ in US cities, become ‘urban operations’ as 
much as counterinsurgency warfare on the streets of Baghdad. Importantly, then, 
militarised paradigms of urban control, surveillance and reconfiguration now 
straddle the traditional ‘inside/outside’ binary between cities within the US nation 
and those outside.  
 
The widening adoption of ‘urban warfare’ doctrine follows centuries when 
Western military planners preached Sun Tzu’s mantra from 1500 BC that the 
“worst policy is to attack cities”.  It follows a post World War II Cold War period 
marked both by discourses of complete urban extermination through the massed 
nuclear targeting of Cold War enemies and a parallel obsession with mass, 
superpower-led ‘Air-Land’ engagements centred on the North European plain 
within and above the spaces between bypassed European city-regions. Whilst 
numerous wars were fought by western forces in developing world cities during 
the Cold war, as part of wider struggles against independence and terrorist 
movements and the ‘hot’ proxy wars, such conflicts were very much seen by 
western military theorists as unusual side-shows to the imagined superpower 
‘Air-Land’ and nuclear engagements (Davis, 2004a). Consequently, the doctrine 
of ‘urban warfare,’ already marginal, received very little attention during the Cold 
War and became even more marginalised within Western military rhetoric (Hills, 
2004). On the rare occasions when urban warfare was specifically addressed in 
Cold War military doctrine, United State’s forces, in the euphemistic language so 
typical of military forces, tended to “approach the urban area by rubbling or 
isolating the city” using tactics unchanged since World War II (Grubs, 2003, iii). 
That is, they either ignored, or sought to systematically annihilate, urban places 
(as at Hue during the Vietnam war). 
 
In the place of such neglect of western military doctrine which specifically 
addresses the challenges of counter-insurgency warfare within cities, a highly 
contested, diverse and complex set of institutional and techno-scientific battles 
are now emerging through which attempts are being made to try and re-imagine 
and reshape Western military forces so that counterinsurgency operations within 
large urban areas become their de facto operations (Hills, 2004). Prevailing 
conceptions of Western military engagement are thus being widely challenged to 
address the perceived perils of engaging in ‘military operations on urban terrain’ 
(or ‘MOUT’).   
 
As the world’s pre-eminent military power, the military forces of the United States 
provide the most interesting and important example of how discursive 
constructions of ‘urban terrain’ are being used to justify attempts at the 
‘transformation’ of the technologies, tactics and strategies of national military 
intervention more broadly (see Ek, 2000).  US military research on ‘urban 
operations’ dwarfs that of all other nations combined (Hills, 2004). The bloody 
experience of the Iraq urban insurgency is already looming large in these 
debates. A major review of the imperative of urban warfare ‘doctrine’ for US 
forces, prepared by Major Lee Grubbs in 2003, for example, stated baldly that 
“as the Iraq plan evolves, it is clear that the enemies of the United State’s military 
have learned a method to mitigate the Joint [US] Force’s dominance in long 
range surveillance and engagement. The enemy will seek the city and the 
advantages of mixing with non-combatants” (2003, 56). 
 
One particularly important feature of US military discourses on urbanisation 
looms large in such debates. This is the way in which the sheer three-
dimensional complexity and scale of global south cities allegedly undermine the 
United State’s expensively assembled and hegemonic advantages in 
surveillance, targeting and killing through ‘precise’ air and space-based weapons 
systems (Graham, 2003, Davis, 2004b).   
 
In such a context, this article seeks to analyse critically the ways in which 
processes of urbanisation are currently being imagined by US military theorists to 
significantly undermine the military and techno-scientific dominance of the US 
military in a rapidly urbanising world.  The article is motivated by the argument 
that the processes through which US military planners imagine, and discursively 
construct, global south cities as their predominant ‘battlespace’ for the early 21
st
 
century, demands critical social scientific scrutiny.  The article falls in to three 
parts. In the first, discursive problematisation of global south cities produced by 
US military urban researchers and commentators are reviewed. Emphasis is 
placed on how developing world cities are depicted as intrinsically labyrinthine, 
chaotic, structureless and deceptive environments which substantially frustrate 
the wider US geopolitical strategy based on the US military’s advantages in air 
and space-based surveillance, digital processing, and ‘network-centric’ warfare – 
transformations which, together, are sometimes labelled the ‘Revolution in 
Military affairs’ or ‘RMA’   (Latham, 2003).  
 
The second part of the paper goes on to analyse the way in which key actors 
within the US military-industrial complex are suggesting deeply technophiliac 
‘solutions’ to this purported erosion of US geo-strategic power through global 
south urbanisation. Here what I call the ‘urban turn’ of the of the RMA – the shift 
in deeply technophiliac discourses from discussions of planet-straddling weapons 
systems to technological innovations designed to allow the micro-spaces of 
developing world ‘megacities’ to be controlled -- is analysed in detail. Centred on 
the concept of ‘persistent area dominance’ within the so-called ‘Long War, such 
strategies entail the saturation of ‘adversary’ cities with large numbers of 
miniature surveillance and targeting systems. These are being designed to 
support continuous targeting, and destruction, of detected ‘targets’. An 
examination follows of how US and Israeli forces had, by 2007, had already 
begun to implement ideas of robotised or automated urban warfare to counter the 
complex insurgencies in Iraq and Palestine/Israel, respectively. The final part of 
the paper draws brief critical conclusions from the preceding discussions. 
DREAMS FRUSTRATED? URBANISATION AND THE 
 ‘REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS’ (RMA) 
 
“Urban operations represent a black hole in the current Revolution in 
Military Affairs pantheon of technological advantage […]. The technologies 
traditionally ascribed to the current Revolution in Military Affairs 
phenomenon will have negligible impact on Military Operations in Urban 
Terrain” (Harris, 2003, 38-41)  
 
The military strategies to project, sustain and deepen US geopolitical power in 
the post Cold war period (see Roberts et al, 2003, Kirsch, 2003, Barnett, 2004) 
rest on the exploitation of a ‘transformation’ of US military power through what 
has been termed a “Revolution in Military Affairs’ (see Latham 2003, Ek, 2000, 
Pieterse, 2004). Centring on the technologies of ‘stealth,’ ‘precision’ targeting, 
and satellite geo-positioning, the RMA has widely been hailed amongst U.S. 
military planners as the means to sustain US dominance in the post Cold War 
world (Stone, 2004).  
 
Central to the RMA is the notion that “military operations are now aimed at 
defined effects rather than attrition of enemy forces or occupation of ground” 
(Cohen, 2004, 395). Through the interlinkage of the ‘system of systems’ of U.S. 
military technologies, RMA theorists argue that a truly ‘network centric warfare’ is 
now possible through which US forces can continually dominate societies 
deemed to be their adversaries through their increasingly omnipotent 
surveillance and ‘situational awareness’, devastating and precisely-targeted 
aerial firepower, and the suppression and degradation of the communications 
and fighting ability of any opposing forces (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, Graham, 
2005b). Thus, RMA theorists imagine US military operations to be a giant, 
integrated, ‘network enterprise’ – a ‘just-in-time’ system of post-human, 
cyborganised warriors which utilises many of the principles of logistics chain 
management and new-technology based tracking that are so dominant within 
contemporary management models (Gray, 2003).  
 
Importantly, however, such technophiliac discourses depicting an RMA ushering 
new relatively reduced-risk, ‘clean’ and painless strategy of US military 
dominance assumed that the vast networks of sensors and weapons that needed 
to be integrated and connected to project US power would work uninterruptedly 
(see, for example, Figure 1). Global scales of flow and connection have thus 
dominated RMA discourses; technological mastery, omnipotent surveillance, 
real-time ‘situational awareness’, and speed-of-light digital interactions, have 
been widely portrayed as processes which, intrinsically, would usher in US 
military ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’, on a planetary scale, irrespective of the 
geographical terrain that was to be dominated.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: The US Military’s  ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ as signifying 
ageographical mastery through uninterrupted surveillance and networking 
 
RMA discourses have, in this sense, been notably ageographical. Crucially, from 
the point of view of the current paper, little account was taken of the geographical 
specificities of the spaces or geographical terrains inhabited by the purported 
adversaries of the US in the post Cold War period (or how they are changing 
through processes of urbanisation and globalisation).  A key axiom of RMA 
rhetoric has been the idea that the US was now able to prosecute its global 
strategies for geopolitical dominance through a “radical non-territoriality” 
(Duffield, 2002, 158). 
 
In response to this neglect of global urbanisation within RMA discourses, and 
spurred on by the catastrophic and ongoing urban insurgency since the US-UK 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, an increasingly powerful range of counter-discourses 
have emerged within the US military. Through these a second group of US 
military theorists have asserted that the technophiliac dreams of RMA will either 
fail, or be substantially undermined, by global processes of urbanisation, 
especially in the global south cities where they imagine US forces being most 
often engaged.  The pronouncements of those advocating an ‘urban turn’ in the 
RMA have had two main features. 
 
Signal Failures: Urban Environments as Physical 
Interrupters to ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ 
 
“In simple terms walls tend to get in the way of today’s battlefield 
communications and sensor technologies” (Hewish and Pengelley, 
2001) 
 
Their first major feature has been the strong suggestion that the urban terrain in 
poor, global south countries is a great leveller between high-tech US forces and 
their low-tech and usually informally organised and poorly equipped adversaries 
(Gregory, 2004, Graham, 2005a).  The complex and congested terrain below, 
within, and above cities (Figure  2) is seen here as a set of physical spaces 
which limit the effectiveness of high-tech space-targeted bombs, surveillance 
systems, and automated, ‘network-centric’ and ‘precision’ weapons. The U.S. 
defence research agency, DIRC, for example, argue that “the urban environment 
negates the abilities of present US military communications equipment” resulting 
in dead spots, noise, signal absorbtion, propagation problems which severely 
undermine the principles and technologies of ‘network-centric warfare’”  (DIRC, 
1997).   
 
Figure  2 US military satellite view of part of Baghdad 
(SEPARATE ATTACHMENT) 
 
The architects Misselwitz and Weizman are amongst the very small number of 
critical urban researchers who have addressed the ways in which urbanisation 
undermines the technologies produced by the RMA. They conclude that, within 
contemporary cities: 
 “high-tech military equipment is easily incapacitated. Buildings mask 
targets and create urban canyons, which diminish the capabilities of 
the air force. It is hard to see into the urban battlespace; it is very 
difficult to communicate in it, because radio waves are often disturbed. 
It is hard to use precision weapons because it is difficult to obtain 
accurate GPS satellite locations. And it becomes more and more 
difficult (but not impossible) for the military to shoot indiscriminately 
into the city. For all these reasons, cities continue to reduce the 
advantages of a technologically superior force” (Misselwitz and 
Weizman, 2003, 8).  
 
The ‘urbanisation of battlespace’ is therefore seen by US urban warfare 
commentators to reduce the ability of U.S. forces to fight and kill at a distance 
(always the preferred way because of their ‘casualty dread’ and technological 
supremacy). Cities are therefore seen to produce rapidly escalated risks for US 
forces fighting pre-emptive, expeditionary wars. “From refugee flows to dense 
urban geography, cities create environments that increase uncertainty 
exponentially” (DIRC, 1997). Military operations in cities are therefore seen as 
treacherous Trojan horse-style events, which might allow weak and poorly 
equipped insurgents to gain victory of the world’s remaining military superpower 
(Glenn et al, 2001). 
 
The ‘Urbanisation of Insurgency’: 
Global South Cities as Refuges From US Vertical Power 
 
“Opposition forces will camouflage themselves in the background noise of 
the urban environment. Within the urban environment, it is not the weapon 
itself rather the city which maximises or mutes an arm’s effectiveness” 
(DIRC 1997, 11) 
 
A second main feature of US urban warfare discourses is that the breaking down 
of high technology sensors and weapons, because of the physical morphology of 
cities, will directly and causally lead to an increasing tendency amongst the 
United States’ political adversaries to take refuge within cities.  ”The long term 
trend in open-area combat’, writes the leading U.S. ‘urban warfare’ commentator, 
Ralph Peters (1996, 6), “is toward overhead dominance by US forces.” As a 
result, he predicts that “Battlefield awareness [for US forces] may prove so 
complete, and ‘precision’ weapons so widely available and effective, that enemy 
ground-based combat systems will not be able to survive in the deserts, plains, 
and fields that have seen so many of history’s main battles”  (ibid.). 
 
As a result, Peters argues that the United States’ “enemies will be forced into 
cities and other complex terrain, such as industrial developments and inter-city 
sprawl” (1997, 4). Grau and Kipp, (1999 4), concur, suggesting that: 
 “urban combat is increasingly likely, since high-precision weapons 
threaten operational and tactical manoeuvre in open terrain. 
Commanders who lack sufficient high-precision weapons will find 
cities appealing terrain […], provided they know the city better than 
their opponent does and can mobilize the city’s resources and 
population to their purposes.”  
 
Central to this perception of the incentives underlying what RAND theorists, Taw 
and Hoffman (2000), have termed the ‘urbanisation of insurgency,’ is the notion 
that insurgents exploiting the physical geographies of global south cities can 
force US military personnel to come into very close physical proximity and so 
expose US politicians to much higher casualty rates than stipulated within RMA 
doctrine. DIRC argue that: 
 “The weapons [such insurgents] use may be 30 to 40 years old or 
built from hardware supplies, but at close range many of their 
inefficiencies are negated. The most effective weapon only needs 
to exploit the vulnerabilities that the urban environment creates. 
Each new city will create a different pool of resources and thereby 
create different urban threats” (DIRC, 1997, 8). 
 
Here, the obvious limits of attempting to understand the complex geographies of 
cities through the verticalised surveillance systems emphasised by the RMA are 
a major bone of contention amongst those promulgating the counter discourses 
emphasising the urbanisation of insurgency. A common tendency here is to 
naturalise and essentialise the complex physical and social geographies of global 
south cities as ‘jungle’-like environments, in which small insurgent groups gain 
political and financial support from the wider population, that necessitate new 
techniques to ensure the ‘cleansing’ of the city (Glenn, 1998). As is very common 
in US military and political literature on the threats of future urban insurgencies 
(see Norton, 2003), the DIRC report emphasises that informal and favela districts 
in global south cities add great power to the strategies of insurgent and criminal 
groups utilising the classic techniques of guerrilla and ‘asymmetric’ warfare 
against potential US or western incursion. In such debates, centres of particular 
resistance to US or Israeli military incursion or verticalised control, such as Jenin  
or Fallujah (Figure 3), become especially demonised (Graham, 2003, 2005c).    
More generally, the  argues that: 
 “the shanty sprawl of the developing city frequently allows insurgents 
to adapt their rural strategy more effectively to an urban environment. 
Asymmetric forces have the same benefits and advantages that have 
traditionally been enjoyed in the jungle of forest base: control over 
territory, allegiance (whether voluntary or coerced) of much of a 
country's population, inaccessibility to security forces. The urban 
environment adds reasonably secure bases for operations around 
the heart of government and its administrative and commercial 
infrastructure […]. The urban geography of slums favors the tactics of 
an unconventional force. […] Guerrilla campaigns need not be overall 
military urban success, but rather need only to make the opposition's 
campaigns appear unpalatable to its domestic support. Urban 
warfare favors the media age” (DIRC, 1997, 6) 
 
  
Figure 3 US military satellite image of Fallujah taken during the 
second siege there, November 2004 
 
DREAMS RECLAIMED?  FROM PREEMPTIVE WAR TO  
‘PERSISTENT AREA DOMINANCE’? 
 
“The time has come to change the perception that the high-tech US war 
machine fights at a disadvantage in urban areas” (Houlgate, 2004). 
 
“Urban areas should become our preferred medium for fighting. We should 
optimize our force structure for it, rather than relegating it to Appendix Q in 
our fighting doctrine, treating it as the exception rather than the norm […]. It 
is time to tell Sun Tzu to sit down […]. Instead of fearing it, we must own the 
city” (sic.) Lt. Col. Leonhard, US Army  (2003) 
 With the widespread perception that the intensifying urbanisation of the parts of 
the global south that the US military envisage being their dominant areas of 
operation is radically undermining their broader efforts at techno-scientific 
transformation, a wide range of projects and initiatives are emerging aimed at 
specifically tailoring the ‘RMA’ to the specific geographies of urban areas in the 
global south.  With the urban insurgency in Iraq as an on-going fulcrum war, a 
‘transformation’ based on the technophiliac celebrations of the death of 
geography through new technologies is, ironically, being transformed into a major 
techno-scientific effort to develop and experiment with surveillance, 
communications and targeting systems that are specifically tailored to the fine-
grain physical and human geographies of global south cities.  
 
It is now widely argued within US military strategic organisations and think-tanks 
that the RMA needs to be reconfigured to address the challenges of tightly built 
global south cities; that new bodies of ‘urban’ research need to be built up to 
understand how to use military violence to deliver precise ‘effects’ in such cities; 
and that the doctrine, weaponry, training and equipment of US forces need to be 
comprehensively redesigned so that urban military operations are their de facto 
function. Major Lee Grubbs (2003, iii-5) of the US Army argues that U.S. forces 
need to be redefined so that their main purpose is to “create operational shock in 
the urban environment.” This requires, he argues, a deep understanding of the 
battlespace to identify causality between critical point, action, and effect 
achieved.” In turn, Grubbs suggests that “Operational design and a process for 
understanding the city becomes critical for the selection of critical points to 
destroy, control and influence […]. The challenge is the development of an 
executable operational concept for achieving systematic, across the entire 
system, effects within the urban environment through the selective use of force” 
(ibid.) 
 
A large output of conceptual, techno-scientific and Research and Development 
material has been created by the ‘urban turn’ of the RMA, especially since the 
Iraq invasion (see Grubbs, 2003, Houlgate, 2004). The overwhelming rhetoric in 
such efforts emphasises that new military techno-science, specifically developed 
to address cities, will turn global south urban environments into areas that US 
forces can completely dominate, using their technological advantages, with 
minimum casualties to themselves.  New weapons and sensor programmes, 
specifically designed to enhance the ability of future US forces to control and 
dominate global south cities through network-centric means, are already 
emerging from the wider efforts at physical and electronic simulation, wargaming, 
and the evaluation of the experience of the Iraq insurgency.  These centre, first, 
on unveiling global south cities through new sensor technologies, and, second, 
on developing automated and robotic weapon systems linked to such sensors.  
 
Technophiliac Unveilings of Global South Cities: 
Dreams of ‘Real-Time Situational Awareness’ 
 
The first key effort to redirect the RMA to the purported challenges of US forces 
attempting to dominate and control global south cities involve programmes 
designed to saturate such cities with myriads of networked surveillance systems. 
The dream of US military theorists is that this can be done to such an extent that 
any identified target can be automatically identified at any time and so exposed 
to high-technology tracking and killing powers of ‘network-centric’ weapons. Such 
visions imagine pervasive and interlined arrays of ‘loitering’ and ‘embedded’ 
sensors as overcoming all the limits and interruptions that megacity 
environments place in the way of successfully implementing networks centric 
warfare.  Ackerman  (2002), for example, suggests that such sensor suites will 
be designed to automatically trace dynamic change rather than constantly 
soaking up data from unchanging environments: observing ‘change’ rather than 
observing ‘scenery’, as he puts it. In other words, algorithms will be designed to 
only function when definable changes occur. They will thus identify purported 
notions of ‘normality’ against the ‘abnormal’ behaviours and patterns that can 
then be assessed as targets.  
 
One major example of such a development is the tellingly title ‘Combat Zones 
That See’ project led by the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA)(Figure 4).  Launched at the start of the Iraq insurgency in 2003, CTS 
“explores concepts, develops algorithms, and delivers systems for utilising large 
numbers (1000s) of algorithmic video cameras to provide the close-in sensing 
demanded for military operations in urban terrain.” Through installing 
computerised CCTV across whole occupied cities, the project organisers 
envisage that, when deployed, CTS will sustain  “motion-pattern analysis across 
whole city scales”, linked to the tracking of massive populations of individualised 
cars and people through intelligent computer algorithms linked to the recognition 
of number plates and scanned in human facial photos. “Combat Zones that See”, 
the launch report suggests: 
 “will produce video understanding algorithms embedded in 
surveillance systems for automatically monitoring video feeds to 
generate, for the first time, the reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
targeting information needed to provide close-in, continuous, 
always-on support for military operations in urban terrain” 
(DARPA, 2003a, 6) 
 
  
Figure 4 The Combat Zones That See project under 
development by the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research 
and Projects Agency (DARPA) 
 
A direct response to the interruptive effects of city environments on older notions 
of air and space-based network centric warfare, it is envisaged that, once it has 
been developed by 2007, CTS  “will generate, for the first time, the 
reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting information needed to provide close-
in, continuous, always-on support for military operations in urban terrain” 
(DARPA, 2003a, 6). It will be designed to specifically address the  “inherently 
three-dimensional nature of urban centres, with large buildings, extensive 
underground [passageways, and concealment from above” (DARPA, 2003, 7).  
 
The central challenge of CTS, according to DARPA, will be to build up fully 
representative data profiles on the ‘normal’ time-space movement patterns of 
entire subject cities so that algorithms could then use statistical modelling to  
“determine what is normal and what is not” (quoted in Sniffen, 2003). This will be 
a purported aid to identifying insurgents’ activities and real or potential attacks, 
as well as warning of the presence or movement of target or suspect vehicles or 
individuals. The report states that the CTS project will: 
 “include [...] analysis of changes in normalcy modes; detection 
of variances in activity; anomaly detection based on statistical 
analyses; discovery of links between places, subjects and 
times of activities; and direct comparison and correlation of 
track data to other information available to operators. 
Predictive modelling, plan recognition, and behavior modeling 
should alert operators to potential force protection risks and 
hostile situations. Forensic information (where did a vehicle 
come from, how did it get here?) should be combined and 
contrasted to more powerful ‘forward-tracking’ capabilities 
(where could the vehicle go?, where is the vehicle going?) to 
allow operators to provide real-time capabilities to assess 
potential force threats” (DARPA, 2003, 13). 
 
After a stream of protests from US civil liberties groups, DARPA stressed that, 
whilst the initial test of mass, urban tracking will take place at a US Army base 
within the United States (Fort Belvoir, Virginia), the deployment of CTS will only 
take place in “Foreign urban battlefields” (Defence Watch, 2004).  
 
Saturating occupied or target cities with micro-scale and even nano-scale 
sensors and cameras is also being investigated by the CTS Programme and an 
associated programme labelled HURT. Table 1 shows some of the ‘persistent’ 
and unmanned surveillance platforms currently being considered by DARPA 
through its CTS and HURT Programmes.  
 
Figure 5 DARPA urban ‘Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target 
Acquisition’ (RSTA) platforms as envisaged by its HURT Programme 
(Darpa, 2004).(LOS=Line of Sight) 
 
‘Persistent Area Dominance’: 
Towards Robotic Killing Systems in Urban Warfare 
 
“Military leaders are developing a vision of the tactical operations future 
where adversaries will have to decide if they should send flesh and blood 
troops to fight nuts, bolts, circuits and sensors.” (Lawlor, 2003) 
 
The second main area of defence research and development to help assert the 
dominance of US forces over global south cities focuses on a shift towards 
robotic air and ground weapons which, when linked to the persistent surveillance 
and target identification systems just discussed, will be deployed to continually 
and automatically destroy purported targets in potentially endless streams of 
automated killing.  
 
The dreams of linking sentient, automated and omnipotent surveillance systems -
- which bring God-like levels of ‘situational awareness’ to US forces attempting to 
control intrinsically devious global south megacities -- to automated machines of 
killing, pervades the discourses of the urban turn in the RMA (see, for example, 
Huber and Mills, 2002). Pictorial imaginations of this putative future pervade the 
output of the US military industrial complex currently (see for example, Figure 6).  
 
 
 
Figure 6 Raytheon’s imagining of future urban combat in which a range of 
sensors and weapons link to allow US forces to dominate the occupied city 
 
A telling textual example of such omnipotence fantasies  comes from the 
discussion of a model near-future US ‘urban operation’, described by Defense 
Watch magazine during its discussions of DARPA’s CTS Programme just 
discussed (2004).  In their scenario, swarms of micro-scale, and nano-scale 
networked sensors pervade the target city, providing continuous streams of 
target information to arrays of automated weaponry (Featherstone, 2007). 
Together, these systems produce continuous killing and ‘target’ destruction: a 
kind of robotised counter-insurgency operation with US commanders and 
soldiers doing little but overseeing the cyborganised, interlinked and increasingly 
automated killing systems from a safe distance.  Defense Watch (2004) thus 
speculate about “a battlefield in the near future” that is wired up with the systems 
which result from the CTS programme and its followers.  Here unbound 
technophiliac dreams of omnipotent urban control blur into long-standing 
fantasies of cyborganised and robotised warfare. “Several large fans are 
stationed outside the city limits of an urban target that our [sic] guys need to 
take”, they begin: 
“Upon appropriate signal, what appears like a dust cloud emanates 
from each fan. The cloud is blown into town where it quickly 
dissipates. After a few minutes of processing by laptop-size 
processors, a squadron of small, disposable aircraft ascends over the 
city. The little drones dive into selected areas determined by the 
initial analysis of data transmitted by the fan-propelled swarm. Where 
they disperse their nano-payloads.” 
 
 “After this, the processors get even more busy”, continues the scenario: 
”Within minutes the mobile tactical center have a detailed visual and 
audio picture of every street and building in the entire city. Every 
hostile [person] has been identified and located. From this point on, 
nobody in the city moves without the full and complete knowledge of 
the mobile tactical center. As blind spots are discovered, they can 
quickly be covered by additional dispersal of more nano-devices. 
Unmanned air and ground vehicles can now be vectored directly to 
selected targets to take them out, one by one. Those enemy 
combatants clever enough to evade actually being taken out by the 
unmanned units can then be captured of killed by human elements 
who are guided directly to their locations, with full and complete 
knowledge of their individual fortifications and defenses  […]. When 
the dust settles on competitive bidding for BAA 03-15 [the code 
number for the ‘Combat Zones That See’ programme], and after the 
first prototypes are delivered several years from now, our guys are 
in for a mind-boggling treat at the expense of the bad guys” (2004, 
sic.) 
 
Such omnipotence fantasies extend even further to the automated surveillance, 
through emerging brain scanning techniques, of people’s inner mental attitudes 
to any U.S. invasion. This allows ‘targets’ deemed to be resistant can be 
automatically identified and destroyed: 
“Robotic systems push deeper into the urban area […]. Behind the 
fighters, military police and intelligence personnel process the 
inhabitants, electronically reading their attitudes toward the 
intervention and cataloguing them into a database immediately 
recoverable by every fire team in the city (even individual weapons 
might be able to read personal signatures, firing immediately upon 
cueing […]. Smart munitions track enemy systems and profiled 
individuals […] Satellites monitor the city for any air defense fires, 
curing immediate responses from near-space orbiting ‘guns’. 
Drones track inhabitants who have been ‘read’ as potentially 
hostile and ‘tagged’” (Defense Watch, 2004) 
 
Such dreams of continuous, automated, and robotised urban targeting and killing 
are far from being limited to the realms of such futuristic speculation, however. 
Rather, as with the CTS programme, they are fuelling very real multimillion dollar 
research and weapons development programmes aimed at developing ground 
and aerial vehicles which not only navigate and move robotically, but which 
select and destroy targets without ‘humans in the loop’ based on algorithmically-
driven ‘decisions’.  
 Lawlor (2004), for example, discusses the development of ‘autonomous 
mechanized combatant’ air and ground vehicles or ‘tactical autonomous 
combatants’ for the US Air Force. These are being designed, he notes, to use 
“pattern recognition” software for what he calls “ time-critical targeting” i.e. linking 
sensors very quickly to automated weapons so that fleeting ‘targets’ both within 
and outside cities can be continually destroyed. Such doctrine is widely termed 
‘compressing the kill chain’ or ‘sensor to shooter warfare’ in US military parlance 
(Hebert, 2003).  The “swarming of unmanned systems” project team at US forces 
JOINT Command Experimentation Directorate, based in Suffolk, Virginia, he 
states, are so advanced in such experimentation that “autonomous, networked 
and integrated robots may be the norm rather than the exception by 2025”.  
 
By that date, Lawlor predicts that “technologies could be developed […] that 
would allow machines to sense a report of gunfire in an urban environment to 
within one meter, triangulating the position of the shooter and return fire within a 
fraction of a second” providing a completely automated weapon system devoid of 
human involvement. Such plans form part of a $200 billion project to massively 
robotise US ground forces known as "Future Combat System." Under this 
program, it is planned that robotic vehicles will replace one third of US armoured 
vehicles and weapons by 2015.  
 
Lawlor quotes Gordon Johnson, the ‘Unmanned Effects’ team leader for the US 
Army’s ‘Project Alpha’, as saying of an automated anti-sniper system that: 
  “if it can get within one meter, it’s killed the person who’s firing. 
So, essentially, what we’re saying is that anyone who would 
shoot at our forces would die. Before he can drop that weapon 
and run, he’s probably already dead. Well now, these cowards 
in Baghdad would have to play with blood and guts every time 
they shoot at one of our folks. The costs of poker went up 
significantly […]. The enemy, are they going to give up blood 
and guts to kill machines? I’m guessing not” (Herbert, 2003, 3) 
 
Lawlor (2004, 2) predicts that such robo-war systems will “help save lives by 
taking humans out of harm’s way”. Here, tellingly, only US forces are considered 
to fall within the category ‘human’. 
 
TOWARDS KILLER ROBOTS:  
EXPERIMENTATION IN IRAQ AND PALESTINE/ISRAEL 
 
By 2007, such military discourses and technophiliac fantasies were quickly 
moving towards the first stages of implementation on the streets of Iraq’s cities 
(Featherstone, 2007).  
 
Armed Robots Under Human Remote Control 
 
In June 2006 the first armed and remotely controlled ground robots in the history 
of warfare – so-called ‘SWORDS’1 machines armed with machine guns -- were 
deployed in Baghdad (Blech, 2007)(see Figure 7). These allow soldiers to fire the 
systems guns from up to a kilometre away by remote control. 
 
                                                
1
 The Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection 
System 
  
Figure 7 Advert for the SWORDS armed robots first deployed in Iraq in 2007 
 
“While many people are fearful that armed robots will run amok on the 
battlefield,” admits a press release describing trials of this system from the US 
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (2007). In an 
attempt at reassurance, the piece states that the robots still “employ a ‘man in 
the loop’ where they are always under director control of a soldier.  The soldier 
issues commands to the robot and weapons through an operator control unit.   
Commands to rocket and grenade launchers are communicated through a newly 
developed remote firing and control system.” 
 
Col. Terry Griffin, head of joint US Army and Marine Corps robot program, and 
tasked with deploying the next armed machine known as ‘Gladiator’, argues that 
the machines first job will be to disband groups of ‘undesirables’. He cites three 
stages of escalation: “First the robot issues warnings through a loudspeaker. It 
fires rubber bullets. Finally, the robot starts firing its machine gun” (quoted in 
Blech, 2007). 
 
In Israel/Palestine, importantly, the Israeli military are already deploying robotic 
and remotely controlled machine gun turrets, part of the “See-Shoot” system 
developed by Rafael, to deploy lethal force along the 37 mile border with the 
Gaza strip. Such robotic turrets have also been sold to US forces. “Combined 
with a Rafael-developed acoustic sensor detection and direction-finding device, 
[they] essentially becomes a robotic anti-sniper weapon for wheeled or tracked 
vehicles.” (Opall-Rome, 2007). According to Defence News’ Tel Aviv 
correspondent  "each machine gun-mounted station serves as a type of robotic 
sniper, capable of enforcing a nearly 1,500-meter-deep no-go zone" (Barbara 
Opall-Rome, 2007). The guns and their long sensors are “tied in by optic fibre to 
a command network which will also be able to draw information from existing 
ground sensors, manned aircraft, and overhead drones.” (Defense Update, 
2007).   
 
Whilst the longer term shift towards the true automation of firing is envisaged, 
Initially, at least, Israeli soldiers are required to approve ‘See-Shoot’s’ decisions 
to fire. "At least in the initial phases of deployment, we're going to have to keep 
the man in the loop," an unnamed IDF commander remarked recently. "We don't 
want to risk making tragic and politically costly mistakes with such a lethal 
system." (cited in Opall-Rome, 2007). 
 
Israel is also planning to deploy mobile, armed robots to support military 
incursions into Palestinian towns and cities. The hope, according to the 
manufacturing company, Elbit Ground Systems, is that “such robotic vehicles will 
become "triggers" which could discriminate between innocent and peaceful 
activities along the [Gaza-Israel] perimeter, to hostile or suspicious actions, 
based on the target's responses” (Defense Update, 2007). The Israeli military 
also now operates robotic 60-ton bulldozers to aid in house demolition and 
landscape clearance in areas that are deemed to hazardous for human-driven 
bulldozers. 
 
Meanwhile, US investment in the field of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs) – known in the jargon as [Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles]  -- dwarfs 
that in armed ground robots. Initially, attention is centring on introducing more 
and more armed drones which are piloted, and fired, by remote human pilots – 
such as the “Predator’ and its more heavily armed successor – the ‘Reaper.’ In 
the case of the Predator, the many attack missions in the Middle East carried out 
by this drone have actually been ‘piloted’ by CIA personnel in a US Air Force 
base on the other side of the world on the edge of Las Vegas.   
 
Towards Autonomous Killer Robots 
 
As with armed ground robots, however, the shift towards autonomous aerial 
weapons systems is already underway. The US Air Force’s emerging Low Cost 
Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS), for example – one output of the massive 
Future Combat Systems Program -- is a jet powered ‘stand off’ munition which 
has been designed to “autonomously search for, detect, identify, attack and 
destroy theatre missile defence, surface to air missile systems, and 
interdiction/armour targets of military interest” (Sparrow, 2007, 63). It will be 
equipped with a Laser Radar system as well as an Autonomous Target 
Recognition capability that will allow it to search for and identify targets within a 
33 sq. mile area (Sparrow, 2007). 
 
Crucially, such munitions will be equipped with algorithms designed to separate 
‘targets’ from ‘non-targets” automatically. The ultimate goals, according to 
Pinney, a UCAV engineer at Raytheon, is a “kill chain solution” based on “1
st
 
look, 1
st
 feed, 1
st
 kill” where each armed unmanned vehicle continuously “seeks 
out targets on its own” (2003, 16)(see Figure 8). Tirpak (2001), a US air force 
specialist, envisages that humans will be required to make the decisions to 
launch weapons at targets only “until UCAVs establish a track record of reliability 
in finding the right targets and employing weapons properly”.  Then the 
“machines will be trusted to do even that”.   
 
 
 
Figure 8; An image from a Raytheon military sales brochure envisaging a 
range of near-future surveillance and weapons systems which can 
recognise ‘targets’ automatically 
 
In both the air and ground domains, then, much effort is already going in to 
establishing the technologies and ethical protocols, which would allow armed 
robots to use artificial intelligence technologies to autonomously ‘decide’ to 
launch their weapons at targets. Integrated within the Future Combat Systems 
Program within the US military (Sparrow, 2007), efforts here are focusing on the 
shift from piloted armed drones to ones which automatically fire at targets, at 
armed ground robots which operate independently, and at armed missiles, 
bombs and munitions which ‘loiter’ over a district or city ‘seeing’ out targets to 
attack over extended periods of time.  
 
Armed autonomous ground vehicles, labelled tactical autonomous combatants 
(TACs), are being developed for missions deemed too dangerous, lengthy or 
simply long for humans. The previously cited Gordon Johnson, ‘unmanned 
effects team leader’ at the Project Alpha, cites the advantages of such a strategy 
for US forces addressing the challenges of future urban warfare: 
“At the tactical level, TACs aren’t going to get hungry, they’re not 
going to get tired, they’re not going to get ‘Dear John’ letters and 
have their minds concentrating on something other than what 
they are supposed to be thinking about. They have all the 
information they require that is available to blue forces at their 
disposal to help make decisions because they are all networked 
together. And if they need information that they don’t have in 
their local database, they’ll send out a request to ‘The Net’ and 
would get the information they need or collaborate with other 
machines and get the information they need,” (cited in Lawlor, 
2003) 
 
A whole universe of ‘automated target recognition’ software is also evolving here, 
allowing robots’ computers to continuously compare the electronic signatures of 
‘targets’ with those stored on electronic databases. “Before SWORDS fires its 
first salvo at terrorists in Iraq,” writes Jörg Blech (2007) in Der Spiegel,  “it needs 
the permission of two human operators. […] However, it is only logical that 
decisions over life and death will increasingly be transferred to the machine -- 
just as soon as engineers have figured out how to overcome the problem of 
distinguishing between friends and foes.”  
 
This is where software development efforts in the field of automatic target 
recognition are now concentrating. Geared specifically towards the apparently 
impossible challenge of automatically picking out individual cars and individuals 
within the density and confusion of a major city, these techniques, informed 
closely by experience in Iraq, are now centring on whether spectral imaging, 
using 70 different wavelengths, can differentiate apparently identical vehicles in 
cities (McCarter, 2005).  
 
Dr. John Kerekes, head of one such programme, labelled RASER, at MIT, 
explains that, rather than developing software that automatically identify the 
signatures of military vehicles, the focus now is on tracking and identifying civilian 
cars and trucks in urban contexts. “Nowadays,” he argues, “the problems are in a 
more urban area or a smaller town, but typically not out in the open somewhere, 
and the nature of the threat is much more elusive in the sense that the enemy 
may not be driving military vehicles at all.” In such a context, he wonders:  “Can 
you indeed distinguish between vehicles? These are just ordinary civilian 
vehicles, not of any particular distinguishing characteristics visually. But through 
this extra-spectral information and these additional channels, there may be 
feature that we can use to identify them and tell them apart.” (Cited in McCarter, 
2005). 
 
Once again, it is in the scenarios being proffered by the US military industrial 
complex that we see the possible future of the nascent architectures of robotised 
military power in Iraq and Israel/Palestine. Gary Graham (2004), of DARPA’s 
Tactical Technology Office, introduced a talk at the 2004 DARPAtech 
conference, outlining the agency’s imagination of future counterinsurgency 
operations, as follows: 
 
“I’d like you to imagine the battlefield of the future. Unmanned combat 
aircraft dominate the skies above the theater.  A swarm of unmanned 
ground vehicles prowls the forests and fields of our enemies.  These 
vehicles have sensors that can see, hear, and maybe even smell.    
High above the theater, peering down from space, are spacecraft that 
are being refueled  on-orbit.  Their on-board electronics and software 
are also being upgraded and replaced as easily as sliding a [personal 
computer memory] card in-and-out of a laptop.  A helicopter glides 
over the battlefield and drops a box of missiles.  This box is identical to 
dozens of missile boxes that are already in place on the battlefield, 
many sitting in the rear compartments of Humvees.  These boxes of 
missiles are very different, though.   They aren’t attended by human 
operators, and they already know where they are – each has GPS 
[Global Positioning System] and a COMM [unications] link.  They sit, 
poised, waiting for command signals.  A corporal out in the field sees 
the enemy coming over the hill.  He radios, “I need fire support NOW!”  
The box just dropped by the [helicopter] knows where the corporal is 
and it knows where the bad guys are.  It launches its first flight of 
missiles.  Some are loitering missiles that fly a little slower.  They are 
launched first.  They go up and post a highwatch over the battlefield.  
Next, faster, precision attack missiles are launched and detonate on 
their targets, and we have lots of smoking holes...but we missed one 
or two.  One of the missiles loitering overhead surveys the scene, 
detects a surviving moving target, and says, “You missed one; I can 
take him.”  On command, he dives in and takes out his target.  The 
battle is over.    The enemy never even knew the corporal was there!  
But now you have a lot of smoking holes where the bad guys used to 
be.” (cited in Morrish, 2004). 
 
CONCLUSIONS, CAVEATS, CRITIQUE 
 
“The ultimate expression of sovereignty resides […] in the power 
and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die” (Mbembe, 
2003, 11) 
 The above analysis of what I call the ‘urban turn’ in the US military’s ‘Revolution 
in Military Affairs’ raises key questions about the intersections of war, territory 
and citizenship in the post Cold War world. With the catastrophic counter-
insurgency war on the streets of Iraq’s cities continuing as I write (January 2006), 
this chapter has shown that technophiliac and hyper-militarised approaches to 
dealing with future ‘urban operations’ are emerging within the US military 
complex  which seem likely to strongly shape the culture, doctrine and 
technologies through which US forces perceive, plan and undertake military 
intervention in global south cities in the future. These discourses, imaginations 
and representations tend overwhelmingly to render whole cities as mere physical 
battlespaces to be controlled and dominated through high-technology means. 
They offer the seductive  hope of removing US citizens from the bloody, face to 
face struggle seen in Iraq’s cities. They render urban civilians, and urban 
citizenship, invisible, as urban civilians are constructed as  mere ‘bare life’ 
(Agamben, 1998) inhabiting wider urban landscape constituted entirely as 
collections of physical and military targets.  Finally, these discourses are replete 
with racist, and colonial omnipotence fantasies featuring automated, 
cyborganised warfare. In these, increasingly machinic and distanciated systems 
of surveillance, targeting and killing emerge to gain complete and continuous 
mastery over the complex and three-dimensional landscapes of global south 
megacities in the future.  
 
A large-scale military research and development programme is thus underway in 
the United States to tailor the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ to the specific micro-
geographies of the global south cities that many US military theorists envisage to 
be their main ‘battlespaces’ on the 21st century. Here the cutting-edge techno-
scientific efforts and priorities of the world’s dominant military power are being 
shifted dramatically from an emphasis on globe-spanning control, networking and 
vertical targeting -- treating planet Earth as some unitary, ageographical 
‘battlespace’ -- to one aimed at bringing maximum control, surveillance and killing 
power to the detailed micro-geographies of the burgeoning urban environments 
of the global south. 
 
Two Caveats 
 
Such dreams of omnipotence and robotised killing must, of course, be treated 
with caution. Two important caveats need to be stressed her. The first is that the 
US military, and its associated complex of R and D outfits, have long held 
fantasies of superweapons which would deterministically realise their dreams of 
mastery and omnipotence (Franklin, 1988). As now, such technophiliac dreams 
of mastery have usually evolved closely with the wider discourses of speculative 
fiction and popular geopolitical domains and entertainment industries (Gannon, 
2003). The ‘technological fanaticism’ of both has deep roots within US political, 
popular and military culture (Sherry, 1987).   
 
As Jeremy Black (2001, 97) suggests, we therefore need to be careful to 
interpret the RMA, and its latest ‘urban turn’, not as some quasi-rational response 
amongst US military and political elites to changing geopolitical conditions, but, 
rather, as “symptomatic of a set of cultural and political assumptions that tell us 
more about modern western society than they do about any objective 
assessment of military options”.  
 
A complex cocktail of such ‘cultural and political’ assumptions can, indeed, be 
diagnosed. There is the casualty aversion and a US military tradition and Michael 
Sherry’s (1989) ‘technological fanaticism’. These blend with newer US military 
ideologies suggesting that contemporary warfare is becoming unbound in time 
and space and that technological capital, rather than manpower, is the only way 
that the US can ‘win’ such wars.  Such ingredients, in turn, are closely leavened 
with a widespread fascination within the US military with the future warfare 
dystopias of cyberpunk and other science fiction (see Gannon, 2003).  This 
fascination is widely exploited by the huge supply push of a complicated 
surveillance-corrections-commercial-military-entertainment complex who profit 
from the propagation, and consumption, of military technophiliac fantasies, 
novels, films, video games and weapons programmes (see Der Derian, 2001). 
Finally, added to this mix are long-standing and deeply rooted western Orientalist 
tropes (Graham, 2005a). Through these western media, military and political 
elites alike deem the far-off urban spaces of Asia, Africa and the Middle East to 
be intrinsically devious sites requiring the mobilisation of the latest western 
technoscience in acts of purification, unveiling, and (attempted) control (Graham, 
2005a). 
 
Second, we must remember that the ‘U.S. military’ is far from being some single, 
unitary actor. All of the discourses, projects and programmes analysed in this 
paper remain extremely contested. Within the vast institutional complex that 
together constitutes the ‘US military’, and its associated security and military 
industries and lobby groups, major political battles are underway – fuelled by the 
ongoing nightmare in Iraq -- over the degree to which technophiliac dreams of 
omnipotence, through some urbanised ‘RMA’ or ‘network centric warfare,’ are 
realistic, even in military terms. Many in the US Army, in particular, are deeply 
sceptical that the horrors and ‘fog of war’ in bloody ‘urban operations’ like the 
Iraqi insurgency can ever really be technologised, mediated, and saturated with 
sentient surveillance and targeting systems, to anything like the degree that is 
common in the discursive imaginings driving the programmes discussed above.  
 
Whilst what I have called here the urban turn in the RMA is, of course, being 
driven by often wild and fantastical discourses, its effects are likely to be very 
material and profound.  Massive techno-scientific efforts to equip the US military 
so that they can saturate global south cities with real-time surveillance, targeting 
and killing systems are undoubtedly underway, fuelled by the nascent 
experimentations on the streets of Iraq’s cities and in and above the West Bank 
and Gaza. The latest military-industrial-‘security’ research drive is focusing on 
using new algorithmic surveillance capabilities to try and overcome the ways in 
which the micro-geographies of global south cities are portrayed as environments 
which interrupt wider dreams of US military and technological omnipotence. 
Above all, as the ‘war on terror’ seeks to project notions of war that are unbound 
in time and space, so the sovereign power to kill is in the process of being 
delegated to computer code. 
 
Whether such systems will ever function as imagined even in military terms is, 
then, beside the point. The very existence of a quasi-imperial project by the 
world’s dominant military power’s to launch armies of autonomous killer air and 
ground vehicles into global south cities will – if implemented – seem very likely to 
lead to widespread civilian casualties.  This seems especially so as new 
algorithmic systems seem likely to emerge which are the actual agents of 
continuous, autonomous killing as ‘kill chains’ are ‘compressed’, ‘sensors’ are 
linked automatically to ‘shooters,’ and the dreams of ‘persistent area dominance’ 
achieve full expression through the favourable context of the Bush 
Administration’s large post-9-11 defence spending increases.   
 
Already, remotely controlled killer robots have been involved in what, arguably, 
are war crimes. On January 13th 2006, for example, an armed Predator drone, 
piloted from an air base on the edge of Las Vegas, was sent to assassinate the 
senior Al Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, in the Pashtun area of Pakistan. 
The attack killed 14 villagers, including five children, and prompted mass 
demonstrations across Pakistan’s main cities (Rupert, 2006). 
 
To put it mildly, dreams of clinically identifying and surgically killing only ‘fighters’ 
within cities, through the use of ‘autonomous’ computer algorithms fantasies of 
‘brain scans’ and automated weapons systems are both dangerously deluded 
and deeply disturbing. Here we confront the added and deeply troubling 
development whereby software agency emerges as the ultimate ‘intelligence’ 
automatically stipulating who should die and who should live whilst at the same 
time attempts are made to remove US military personnel as far as possible from 
risk to death and injury. Four main objections may be made to these 
developments.  
 
Political Temptations of Robotised War 
 
First, the clear risk here is that discourses purporting to emphasise the 
biopolitical rights of US soldiers  to be withdrawn from the streets of urban war 
zones might add justification to the deployment of automated killing systems 
which bring urban civilians in the global south in to the cross-hairs of an 
aggressive colonial hegemon seduced by fantasies of cyborganised war. More 
troubling still, such dreams of automated urban war might combine with a political 
desire amongst US political elites to try and project continuous power across 
wide swathes of our urbanizing planet whilst simultaneously exploiting US 
dominance in high technology to be seen to be moving US military personnel out 
of harm’s way. A basic starting point is to deny the reduction of global south cities 
to physical, uninhabited spaces whose very geographies are essentialised as a 
geopolitical risk to the verticalised power of the US military. For these discourses 
directly lead to the dehumanisation of the citizens of these cities within the hyper-
militarised rhetoric which dominates the US military, a process which, in turn, 
renders their lives, deaths, and citizenship of no account. 
 
It seems inevitable that the shift towards killer robots operating autonomously 
will, to use Steve Featherstone’s words, “reduce even further the costs, both 
fiscal and human, of the choice to wage war” (2007, 50). Thus, the deployment of 
armed robots may so increase the propensity of states armed with them to 
undertake wars. As Featherstone’s suggests: 
“Robots to not have to be recruited, trained, fed or paid extra for 
combat duty. When they are destroyed, there are no death benefits to 
disburse. Shipping off to hostile lands doesn’t require the expenditure 
of political capital, either […]. Within our lifetime, robots will give us 
[sic] the ability to wage war without committing ourselves to the human 
cost of actually fighting a war” (2007, 50). 
 
The possibility of deploying swarms of armed and unarmed robots to ‘loiter’ on a 
‘persistent’ basis across those parts of the world deemed to be ‘trouble spots’ 
clearly fits particularly well within the Pentagon’s prevailing ideologies 
surrounding the ‘global war on terrorism’ (or  what is now termed the ‘long war’). 
The danger here is of the delegation of the state’s sovereign power to kill to 
assemblages of silicon, titanium and software code, in acts of killing which 
manage are unbound from the defined times and spaces of traditional wars whilst 
at the same time falling conveniently beneath the radar screens of mainstream 
media.  
 
Dreams of ‘Humane’ War 
 
Second, the political temptations of deploying robotised armies are being 
encouraged further by arguments that the conscientious and ethically equipped 
‘robotic warriors’ of the future might somehow be more ‘humane’ than human 
ones.  Ronald Arkin, of the Georgia Institute of Technology, is developing a 
set of ethical rules the United State’s emerging robotic killer robots. He 
argues that, equipped with such a “software conscience”, combat robots 
would not be tempted to commit atrocities against civilians. He suggests 
that "robots could behave more humanely than human beings" because 
they could select an ethical framework most suitable to their particular 
mission and disobey commands that contradicted this (cited in Blech, 
2007).  
 
Such arguments miss a key point, however. This is that it is only through 
the use of pre-defined database of ‘targets’ that armed robots will ever be 
able to fire autonomously. The political act of targeting and killing will thus 
be shaped very heavily by the supposed electronic signatures of enemies 
and enmity that human programmers define into software code. Given that 
the United State’s ‘targets’ within the ‘war on terror’ now increasingly blend 
inseparably into the mass of urban civilian life, at home and abroad, the 
predictive definition of the targets to be fought by autonomous killer robots 
will inevitably lead to both errors and widespread death and maiming of 
people who happen to be in the way. As Edward Luttwak (2007) suggests, 
“in practice, unless insurgents carry recognizable weapons, it is simply 
impossible to differentiate between them and innocent people going about 
their peaceful business.”  This means that automated sensing and killing 
systems are very likely to render everyone and everything as real or 
potential targets within an all-compassing idea of ‘battlespace’. They will 
act accordingly if they are ever given autonomy from human supervision. 
 
Killer Robots and War Crimes 
 
Third, Philosopher, Robert Sparrow (2007, 62), worries that it will become 
increasingly impossible to attribute war crimes to humans at all. “It is a necessary 
condition for fighting a just war, under the principle of jus in bellum [or just war], 
that someone can be justly held responsible for deaths that occur in the course of 
the war,” he writes. However, “as this condition cannot be met in relation to 
deaths caused by an autonomous weapon system it would therefore be unethical 
to deploy such systems in warfare.” 
 
Crossovers Between Expeditionary War and Domestic Cities 
 
Finally, it is important to see the shift towards robotised control and weapons 
systems deployed within quasi-imperial projects over colonised space, and 
struggles over the domestic city. The control technologies that are at the centre 
of US operations in Iraq – biometrics, algorithmic surveillance, data mining and 
networked computing – are identical to those at the heart of the so-called 
‘Homeland Security’ drive within US cities.  As ever, then, major cross-overs are 
occurring between technophiliac projects described here and the post 9/11 
‘surveillance surge’ within western cities.  
 
Take, for example, the deepening intersections between ‘algorithmic’ and 
digitised CCTV on city streets and international borders on the one hand, and the 
products of the urbanised RMA on the other. Such crossovers are especially 
important given the growing privatisation of western militaries and law 
enforcement and security industries, and the efforts by a small number of 
military-security ‘prison industrial complex’ conglomerates to colonise both 
‘homeland’ and ‘war zone battlespaces’ equally. As the barriers separating the 
technoscience of ‘civil’ law enforcement and military urban operations are 
progressively dismantled so the algorithmic surveillance systems embedded into 
the urbanising zones of pre-emptive, continuous war, will increasingly resemble 
those in the increasingly securitised cities policed by national security states (and 
associated private military corporations). Both, after all, are designed to 
autonomously track, locate and target those people and activities deemed to be 
threatening within the incalculable complexity of the military analysts call the 
background, ‘urban clutter.’  
 
Here we confront the latest stage in a long history where disciplinary devices are 
developed to assert control and dominance for colonising powers within 
colonised cities being later transmuted back into  ‘homeland’ cities by military and 
political elites. With the sorts of wide-area, algorithmic urban surveillance system 
being developed by DARPA and their ilk so similar to systems envisaged as part 
of the ‘homeland security’ drive to securitise cities in the capitalist heartlands of 
the global north, these crossovers are already strengthening further. 
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